Cargo containers, e.g., intermodal containers, are commonly used to ship goods from one location to another. Goods are packed into the cargo container, and the doors are closed and latched. Then, the cargo container is transported to its destination by a transport vessel, such as a truck, plane, train or ship. At the destination, the container doors are unlatched and opened, and the goods are removed.
In the United States alone, in 2001, approximately 16 million cargo containers arrived within the United States by ship, truck and railroad. In 2001, the United States Customs processed approximately 214,000 vessels carrying approximately 5.7 million cargo containers. Globally, over 200 million cargo containers move between various seaports per year.
The National Cargo Security Council has estimated that, as of 1998, annual cargo theft in the United States cost approximately $10 billion per year, which after adjustment for inflation is approximately five times higher than 20 to 25 years ago. This estimate reflects only the value of the lost goods. When the cost of incident investigations, insurance paperwork and insurance claims are taken into account, the actual annual business impact of cargo theft is estimated to be between $30 billion and $60 billion per year.
It should be noted that most theft goes unnoticed until final delivery, due in part to the nature of multimodal transportation. By the time of delivery, backtracking to the point of loss is often difficult or impossible.
The need for more secure methods of shipping goods in the United States became apparent after the large scale national security breach on Sep. 11, 2001. At that time, United States Customs and others responsible for monitoring the shipment of goods into the United States relied primarily on printed documentation and visual inspection of the cargo itself. Systems for tracking cargo as it traveled were essentially non-existent. Further, there was no way of inspecting the contents of a shipping container without opening the container and risking that the cargo is dangerous. Developments after Sep. 11, 2001 include changing from paper to electronic booking and manifests, using gamma- and x-ray scanners to examine container contents without opening them, and creating portals on which authorized users can track shipping information. Even with these new developments, inspectors are still unable to tell what is in a container without making a visual inspection of the container, and unable to track the contents of shipments during transit without intrusive inspection.
Currently, United States Customs thoroughly screens and examines all shipments deemed to potentially pose a risk to United States security. The goal of United States Customs is to screen these shipments before they depart for the United States whenever possible. To do so, Customs receives electronic bill of lading/manifest data for approximately 98 percent of the sea containers before they arrive at U.S. seaports. Customs uses this data to first identify the lowest risk cargo being shipped by long-established and trusted importers. In the year 2000, nearly half a million individuals and companies imported products into the United States. But 1,000 companies (the top two tenths of one percent) accounted for 62 percent of the value of all imports. Some shipments for these companies are still randomly inspected, but the vast majority is released without physical inspection.
One advancement in security includes the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Started by the Customs Service in early 2002, CSI puts teams of Customs professionals in ports around the world to target containers that may pose a risk for terrorism. CSI lays out goals including: intensifying targeting and screening of containers at ports worldwide, before the containers are loaded and sent to their final destinations; including national security factors in targeting; providing additional outreach to United States industry for cooperation, idea generation, and data collection; establishing security criteria for identifying containers that may pose a risk for terrorism, based on advance information; pre-screening containers at the earliest possible point using technology to quickly pre-screen containers that may pose a risk for terrorism; developing secure and “smart” containers; significantly increasing ability to intercept containers that may pose a risk for terrorism, before they reach United States shores; increasing the security of the global trading system; facilitating smooth movement of legitimate trade; protecting port infrastructures; enhancing safety and security for all; giving a competitive advantage to the trade; international reciprocity; insurance; deterrence.
The top twenty ports in the world, which handle approximately 70% of containers destined for the United States, are now participating in CSI. In cooperation with the host government, CSI teams work in the foreign country to identify and target high-risk containers for pre-screening. The host government then conducts the inspection while the CSI team observes. Low-risk and CSI pre-screened containers enter without additional delay unless more information dictates otherwise. CSI both increases security and facilitates flow of legitimate trade. Specific successes include important seizures at several CSI ports.
Current processes fail to provide the ability to monitor shipments, control their accessibility, and detect security breaches therein. They do not support a system that allows for the tracking of cargo in transit, the monitoring of cargo to ascertain cargo container integrity during transit, and to verify container contents without intrusive verification. A system and method are needed that allow for monitoring of shipments, monitoring of the actual contents of shipments, control of accessibility, and quick detection of potential security breaches.